East African Community
Veto Power Under the East African Community
Nov 20, 2024
Iddah Apondi
0:00/1:34
Regional integration is often considered essential for the development of countries. However, there are doubts about whether regional organizations like the East Africa Community (EAC) have contributed to economic growth within the region. It is well known that Africa's integration efforts have been unsuccessful. While other regions have used integration to improve their economic well-being, like the European Union, Africa has lagged in terms of GDP growth, per capita income, capital inflows, and overall living standards. This is a widespread issue across the continent, despite numerous policy plans and ambitious visions, to advance the economic integration of states. Within the East African Community, problems such as decision-making stalemates, failure to meet financial obligations, and political and international economic interference, have led to a proposal from the Kenyan delegation to introduce veto power to address these issues. The potential impact of this proposal on the region's economic situation is a matter of debate. Therefore, the argument is that this proposal may do more harm than good for economic growth and development in the region if other underlying issues are not resolved. Therefore, a political-economic approach to understanding regional integration, specifically within the context of the East African Community, involves asking how political and economic factors interplay to influence the effectiveness and dynamics of regional integration.
The East African Community (EAC) was founded in 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda joined in 2007, followed by South Sudan in 2016. The Democratic Republic of Congo became the newest member in 2022. The EAC, a prominent regional economic bloc in Africa, has made significant strides in establishing a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market for its members. In 2022, intra-regional trade within the EAC reached $10 billion, while trade with the rest of the world amounted to $62 billion. The organization remains diverse, encompassing countries from Kenya to Somalia in the north and eastward to DR Congo. However, despite its diversity, the EAC faces challenges in consolidating various interests, be they economic, political, or security-related, as each new member brings its own set of issues.
The initial endeavor of the EAC failed due to a plethora of reasons, one of which was the challenges in achieving a consensus on numerous issues. Consensus-building on regional matters is a time-consuming process, thereby impeding the advancement of the regional project. The EAC initiative is still a work in progress on multiple fronts. Certain member states have not fully adhered to various protocols essential for the effective functioning of the organization. Some member states delay the ratification of agreements, causing frustration among other partners who perceive this as hindering progress. Additionally, some partner states have not contributed equally to the financial obligations of the regional body. In certain partner states, there is still skepticism towards the projects, or at the very least, a lack of wholehearted support compared to other member states. All these necessitated the call to introduce veto power as an attempt to speed up decision-making on “pertinent” economic decisions.
POLITICAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND VETO POWER WITHIN THE EAC
Some have characterized veto power under international law as the entitlement to refuse a decision or proposal put forth by a legislative body. Essentially, it involves withholding approval for a proposal, potentially leading to its rejection or reconsideration. In certain political and economic unions such as the European Union, this has occurred for certain issues where national interests are high, such as foreign policy, defense, enlargement, finances, or amendments to the treaty. In such instances, member states make decisions based on unanimity. The argument then lies in the rationale behind Kenya’s push for veto within the EAC, when there is a fading allure of veto power across regional organizations that once held on to them, particularly in the European Union, where the African Union and East African Community are modeled after. This is evidenced by the 2009 Lisbon treaty that further solidifies the argument on the impracticality of introducing veto power within the community. The treaty has narrowed down the list of things states can veto. The Council of the EU now makes most decisions by a qualified majority. This means that at least 55% of member states must agree. With the current 27 member states, that’s 15 countries. Together, they must represent at least 65% of the total population of the European Union. This then begs the question, why would the East African community adopt a model that is being modified to represent theirs, while they scramble to wear loose-fitting clothes?
Contrary to the EU, in Africa – upon reflection of their struggles for independence –, they have opted for a consensus-based decision-making model. For instance, according to the East African Community Charter, members have equal voting rights and make most decisions through consensus. However, the effectiveness of this decision-making model on economic projects has been debated over the years, and the introduction of new members has brought challenges in terms of the speed of decision-making coupled with state financial contributions. This has led to calls to ratify the founding treaty of the EAC to introduce veto power, which is argued to be counterproductive and detrimental to the region's autonomy.
The Kenyan delegation proposed a revision of the EAC treaty to adjust partner states' contributions based on their financial capabilities, with those contributing more, gaining veto power. The Kenyan parliamentary Wanjiuku Maina, chair of the Regional Integration, tabled in the Kenyan parliament the need for the committee on regional integration to review, as aforementioned. The proposed amendment to the treaty highlighted that financial constraints resulting from delayed partner state contributions and reduced support from development partners are negatively impacting the performance of EAC institutions, hindering the progress of key projects and programs aimed at improving the lives of East Africans. These challenges, it is argued, underscore the need for a review and amendment of the EAC treaty to include veto power for faster decision-making within the community. Although some might question the extent to which the delegation fully understands the scope of capacity bestowed on veto power and its subsequent functions.
As we look at how the veto is applied in other regional and multinational bodies like the United Nations Security Council, veto power is used to cast a negative vote against any resolution in the UN council by the permanent members or the president of the parliament like that of the European Union. In simpler terms, veto is the right to reject a proposal or decision. From this, we can clearly see that the Kenyan delegation have either misconstrued the capacity of veto power or have refused to overlook its crippling function in these bodies. For the expectation of the delegation that this introduction will increase decisions within the EAC is merely just a mirage. Unless the expectation is to reject various resolutions by other nations that do not have a direct advantage, then this proposal holds no weight.
When looking at veto power, introspection into the political and economic dynamics of states is integral in understanding the effectiveness of this proposal. Going by the proposal, the introduction of veto power fails to consider the intricacies of the member states, particularly the key players such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and the ongoing discourse on hegemony in the East African region. These three nations, as the founding members, have essentially established a form of hegemony, positioning themselves as the leaders shaping the politics and vision of the EAC. Kenya, for instance, has played a significant role in peacekeeping efforts, notably in the context of South Sudan and the revitalization of peace agreements. On the other hand, Tanzania has traditionally maintained a more introspective approach, influenced by its socialist history, and has often refrained from commenting on regional or global matters. While collaborating with international and regional partners, Tanzania is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional bloc. Turning to Uganda, the country has played a crucial role in various regional conflicts, such as in Somalia against the al-Shabaab group. Additionally, Uganda has been involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo, partly due to the presence of former rebel groups that originated in Uganda and later moved to the DRC, contributing to instability in the region. Although Kenya remains economically dominant, other countries like Tanzania and Uganda are gradually challenging its economic influence. Therefore, Kenya's push for veto power can be seen as an effort to solidify its leadership position in the region, leveraging its economic strength.
Moreover, the inclusion of veto provisions in the region could potentially lead to the fragmentation of the EAC. Currently, the EAC consists of seven countries, a significant increase from the original three in 1999 or even back in 1967. Approaching a quarter of a century in its second iteration of regional integration and welcoming new members, the EAC has undoubtedly achieved success. Various countries joined the EAC for different reasons – some for historical significance, some to enhance their regional influence, and others to explore new economic and social opportunities. This diversity in motivations highlights the need for consensus among member states to effectively drive the regional integration agenda. Introducing veto powers to select member states based on arbitrary criteria would establish a two-tier membership structure, where certain votes hold more weight than others. This approach would ultimately hinder the progress of EAC initiatives.
The treaty's principles are broad enough to be applied to all members. For example, the treaty emphasizes the importance of being people-centered, market-driven, and led by the private sector. In terms of programs, the focus is on infrastructure and energy development, among other things, with concerns such as membership contributions or official languages being considered basic. Kenya's decision to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union undermines the relevance of the EAC, as it disregards the concerns of other EAC members. This suggests that Kenya's push for veto power within the EAC is more self-serving than beneficial for the economic bloc. Members of the EAC are increasingly prioritizing their national interests over the principles of the EAC treaty.
Truthfully, the EAC treaty requires revisions. However, granting veto powers to certain partner states would have a detrimental impact on the future of the regional initiative and is not a top priority within the region. As aforementioned, a hierarchy among partner states would be established, giving some undue authority over others. The current approach of reaching decisions through consensus within the EAC ensures that all voices in the community are acknowledged and respected. The effectiveness of this approach relies on the institutional framework, good governance, and the behavior of member states. To ensure the sustainability of the community, the focus should be on the criteria for admitting new members: ensuring that new members meet set criteria would lessen the burden on financial contribution, which seems to be of concern. Making decisions based solely on financial strength would only lead to further instability in the regional projects. Thus in order to mitigate the latter, a revision of membership criteria is proposed. Kenya's argument that other members are not contributing enough does not justify the introduction of veto powers in an economic integration body that is already struggling. Therefore, one may question the relevance of Kenya's move to introduce veto powers in the EAC, especially within the context of Africa as a whole.
In comparison to the European Union, the EAC does not have the necessary structural, political, social, and actor infrastructure to maintain strong bargaining power during negotiations. The attempt to change the focus of the treaty that established the EAC seems to reflect a neo-colonialist agenda. When regional projects that only benefit certain nations are introduced, it undermines the efforts for economic liberation within the bloc. The issues within the EAC are due to structural and individual challenges within member states. The political will of member states is a key factor in the ongoing challenges facing the EAC. These challenges include political and legal disparities among the governments.
Moreover, the strength of a bloc depends heavily on its leadership. Currently, the EAC is under the leadership of President Salva Kiir from South Sudan, whose leadership is facing challenges due to the fragile state of his country characterized by weak governance, corruption, and insecurity. South Sudan's vulnerability contrasts with the stronger EAC countries it leads, making it difficult for the nation to assert its authority over these more stable states. Therefore, the EAC needs to conduct a thorough self-assessment before considering the introduction of veto power in the decision-making process of the regional organization. The EAC should not only define clear objectives but also take a strong stance in promoting peace and stability among its members and the bloc as a whole, to prevent potential foreign economic influence in the region.
Ultimately, with the continued intervention by the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF into the economic policies of individual states coupled with influential corporations’ interference in agriculture, the push for veto power will further exacerbate and cement this influence to stretch beyond individual states. The fear that African states do not have the bargaining power and backbone to oppose foreign influence will be actualized at the EAC fronts through veto power privileges.
Regional integration is often considered essential for the development of countries. However, there are doubts about whether regional organizations like the East Africa Community (EAC) have contributed to economic growth within the region. It is well known that Africa's integration efforts have been unsuccessful. While other regions have used integration to improve their economic well-being, like the European Union, Africa has lagged in terms of GDP growth, per capita income, capital inflows, and overall living standards. This is a widespread issue across the continent, despite numerous policy plans and ambitious visions, to advance the economic integration of states. Within the East African Community, problems such as decision-making stalemates, failure to meet financial obligations, and political and international economic interference, have led to a proposal from the Kenyan delegation to introduce veto power to address these issues. The potential impact of this proposal on the region's economic situation is a matter of debate. Therefore, the argument is that this proposal may do more harm than good for economic growth and development in the region if other underlying issues are not resolved. Therefore, a political-economic approach to understanding regional integration, specifically within the context of the East African Community, involves asking how political and economic factors interplay to influence the effectiveness and dynamics of regional integration.
The East African Community (EAC) was founded in 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda joined in 2007, followed by South Sudan in 2016. The Democratic Republic of Congo became the newest member in 2022. The EAC, a prominent regional economic bloc in Africa, has made significant strides in establishing a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market for its members. In 2022, intra-regional trade within the EAC reached $10 billion, while trade with the rest of the world amounted to $62 billion. The organization remains diverse, encompassing countries from Kenya to Somalia in the north and eastward to DR Congo. However, despite its diversity, the EAC faces challenges in consolidating various interests, be they economic, political, or security-related, as each new member brings its own set of issues.
The initial endeavor of the EAC failed due to a plethora of reasons, one of which was the challenges in achieving a consensus on numerous issues. Consensus-building on regional matters is a time-consuming process, thereby impeding the advancement of the regional project. The EAC initiative is still a work in progress on multiple fronts. Certain member states have not fully adhered to various protocols essential for the effective functioning of the organization. Some member states delay the ratification of agreements, causing frustration among other partners who perceive this as hindering progress. Additionally, some partner states have not contributed equally to the financial obligations of the regional body. In certain partner states, there is still skepticism towards the projects, or at the very least, a lack of wholehearted support compared to other member states. All these necessitated the call to introduce veto power as an attempt to speed up decision-making on “pertinent” economic decisions.
POLITICAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND VETO POWER WITHIN THE EAC
Some have characterized veto power under international law as the entitlement to refuse a decision or proposal put forth by a legislative body. Essentially, it involves withholding approval for a proposal, potentially leading to its rejection or reconsideration. In certain political and economic unions such as the European Union, this has occurred for certain issues where national interests are high, such as foreign policy, defense, enlargement, finances, or amendments to the treaty. In such instances, member states make decisions based on unanimity. The argument then lies in the rationale behind Kenya’s push for veto within the EAC, when there is a fading allure of veto power across regional organizations that once held on to them, particularly in the European Union, where the African Union and East African Community are modeled after. This is evidenced by the 2009 Lisbon treaty that further solidifies the argument on the impracticality of introducing veto power within the community. The treaty has narrowed down the list of things states can veto. The Council of the EU now makes most decisions by a qualified majority. This means that at least 55% of member states must agree. With the current 27 member states, that’s 15 countries. Together, they must represent at least 65% of the total population of the European Union. This then begs the question, why would the East African community adopt a model that is being modified to represent theirs, while they scramble to wear loose-fitting clothes?
Contrary to the EU, in Africa – upon reflection of their struggles for independence –, they have opted for a consensus-based decision-making model. For instance, according to the East African Community Charter, members have equal voting rights and make most decisions through consensus. However, the effectiveness of this decision-making model on economic projects has been debated over the years, and the introduction of new members has brought challenges in terms of the speed of decision-making coupled with state financial contributions. This has led to calls to ratify the founding treaty of the EAC to introduce veto power, which is argued to be counterproductive and detrimental to the region's autonomy.
The Kenyan delegation proposed a revision of the EAC treaty to adjust partner states' contributions based on their financial capabilities, with those contributing more, gaining veto power. The Kenyan parliamentary Wanjiuku Maina, chair of the Regional Integration, tabled in the Kenyan parliament the need for the committee on regional integration to review, as aforementioned. The proposed amendment to the treaty highlighted that financial constraints resulting from delayed partner state contributions and reduced support from development partners are negatively impacting the performance of EAC institutions, hindering the progress of key projects and programs aimed at improving the lives of East Africans. These challenges, it is argued, underscore the need for a review and amendment of the EAC treaty to include veto power for faster decision-making within the community. Although some might question the extent to which the delegation fully understands the scope of capacity bestowed on veto power and its subsequent functions.
As we look at how the veto is applied in other regional and multinational bodies like the United Nations Security Council, veto power is used to cast a negative vote against any resolution in the UN council by the permanent members or the president of the parliament like that of the European Union. In simpler terms, veto is the right to reject a proposal or decision. From this, we can clearly see that the Kenyan delegation have either misconstrued the capacity of veto power or have refused to overlook its crippling function in these bodies. For the expectation of the delegation that this introduction will increase decisions within the EAC is merely just a mirage. Unless the expectation is to reject various resolutions by other nations that do not have a direct advantage, then this proposal holds no weight.
When looking at veto power, introspection into the political and economic dynamics of states is integral in understanding the effectiveness of this proposal. Going by the proposal, the introduction of veto power fails to consider the intricacies of the member states, particularly the key players such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and the ongoing discourse on hegemony in the East African region. These three nations, as the founding members, have essentially established a form of hegemony, positioning themselves as the leaders shaping the politics and vision of the EAC. Kenya, for instance, has played a significant role in peacekeeping efforts, notably in the context of South Sudan and the revitalization of peace agreements. On the other hand, Tanzania has traditionally maintained a more introspective approach, influenced by its socialist history, and has often refrained from commenting on regional or global matters. While collaborating with international and regional partners, Tanzania is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional bloc. Turning to Uganda, the country has played a crucial role in various regional conflicts, such as in Somalia against the al-Shabaab group. Additionally, Uganda has been involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo, partly due to the presence of former rebel groups that originated in Uganda and later moved to the DRC, contributing to instability in the region. Although Kenya remains economically dominant, other countries like Tanzania and Uganda are gradually challenging its economic influence. Therefore, Kenya's push for veto power can be seen as an effort to solidify its leadership position in the region, leveraging its economic strength.
Moreover, the inclusion of veto provisions in the region could potentially lead to the fragmentation of the EAC. Currently, the EAC consists of seven countries, a significant increase from the original three in 1999 or even back in 1967. Approaching a quarter of a century in its second iteration of regional integration and welcoming new members, the EAC has undoubtedly achieved success. Various countries joined the EAC for different reasons – some for historical significance, some to enhance their regional influence, and others to explore new economic and social opportunities. This diversity in motivations highlights the need for consensus among member states to effectively drive the regional integration agenda. Introducing veto powers to select member states based on arbitrary criteria would establish a two-tier membership structure, where certain votes hold more weight than others. This approach would ultimately hinder the progress of EAC initiatives.
The treaty's principles are broad enough to be applied to all members. For example, the treaty emphasizes the importance of being people-centered, market-driven, and led by the private sector. In terms of programs, the focus is on infrastructure and energy development, among other things, with concerns such as membership contributions or official languages being considered basic. Kenya's decision to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union undermines the relevance of the EAC, as it disregards the concerns of other EAC members. This suggests that Kenya's push for veto power within the EAC is more self-serving than beneficial for the economic bloc. Members of the EAC are increasingly prioritizing their national interests over the principles of the EAC treaty.
Truthfully, the EAC treaty requires revisions. However, granting veto powers to certain partner states would have a detrimental impact on the future of the regional initiative and is not a top priority within the region. As aforementioned, a hierarchy among partner states would be established, giving some undue authority over others. The current approach of reaching decisions through consensus within the EAC ensures that all voices in the community are acknowledged and respected. The effectiveness of this approach relies on the institutional framework, good governance, and the behavior of member states. To ensure the sustainability of the community, the focus should be on the criteria for admitting new members: ensuring that new members meet set criteria would lessen the burden on financial contribution, which seems to be of concern. Making decisions based solely on financial strength would only lead to further instability in the regional projects. Thus in order to mitigate the latter, a revision of membership criteria is proposed. Kenya's argument that other members are not contributing enough does not justify the introduction of veto powers in an economic integration body that is already struggling. Therefore, one may question the relevance of Kenya's move to introduce veto powers in the EAC, especially within the context of Africa as a whole.
In comparison to the European Union, the EAC does not have the necessary structural, political, social, and actor infrastructure to maintain strong bargaining power during negotiations. The attempt to change the focus of the treaty that established the EAC seems to reflect a neo-colonialist agenda. When regional projects that only benefit certain nations are introduced, it undermines the efforts for economic liberation within the bloc. The issues within the EAC are due to structural and individual challenges within member states. The political will of member states is a key factor in the ongoing challenges facing the EAC. These challenges include political and legal disparities among the governments.
Moreover, the strength of a bloc depends heavily on its leadership. Currently, the EAC is under the leadership of President Salva Kiir from South Sudan, whose leadership is facing challenges due to the fragile state of his country characterized by weak governance, corruption, and insecurity. South Sudan's vulnerability contrasts with the stronger EAC countries it leads, making it difficult for the nation to assert its authority over these more stable states. Therefore, the EAC needs to conduct a thorough self-assessment before considering the introduction of veto power in the decision-making process of the regional organization. The EAC should not only define clear objectives but also take a strong stance in promoting peace and stability among its members and the bloc as a whole, to prevent potential foreign economic influence in the region.
Ultimately, with the continued intervention by the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF into the economic policies of individual states coupled with influential corporations’ interference in agriculture, the push for veto power will further exacerbate and cement this influence to stretch beyond individual states. The fear that African states do not have the bargaining power and backbone to oppose foreign influence will be actualized at the EAC fronts through veto power privileges.
Regional integration is often considered essential for the development of countries. However, there are doubts about whether regional organizations like the East Africa Community (EAC) have contributed to economic growth within the region. It is well known that Africa's integration efforts have been unsuccessful. While other regions have used integration to improve their economic well-being, like the European Union, Africa has lagged in terms of GDP growth, per capita income, capital inflows, and overall living standards. This is a widespread issue across the continent, despite numerous policy plans and ambitious visions, to advance the economic integration of states. Within the East African Community, problems such as decision-making stalemates, failure to meet financial obligations, and political and international economic interference, have led to a proposal from the Kenyan delegation to introduce veto power to address these issues. The potential impact of this proposal on the region's economic situation is a matter of debate. Therefore, the argument is that this proposal may do more harm than good for economic growth and development in the region if other underlying issues are not resolved. Therefore, a political-economic approach to understanding regional integration, specifically within the context of the East African Community, involves asking how political and economic factors interplay to influence the effectiveness and dynamics of regional integration.
The East African Community (EAC) was founded in 1999 by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda joined in 2007, followed by South Sudan in 2016. The Democratic Republic of Congo became the newest member in 2022. The EAC, a prominent regional economic bloc in Africa, has made significant strides in establishing a free trade area, a customs union, and a common market for its members. In 2022, intra-regional trade within the EAC reached $10 billion, while trade with the rest of the world amounted to $62 billion. The organization remains diverse, encompassing countries from Kenya to Somalia in the north and eastward to DR Congo. However, despite its diversity, the EAC faces challenges in consolidating various interests, be they economic, political, or security-related, as each new member brings its own set of issues.
The initial endeavor of the EAC failed due to a plethora of reasons, one of which was the challenges in achieving a consensus on numerous issues. Consensus-building on regional matters is a time-consuming process, thereby impeding the advancement of the regional project. The EAC initiative is still a work in progress on multiple fronts. Certain member states have not fully adhered to various protocols essential for the effective functioning of the organization. Some member states delay the ratification of agreements, causing frustration among other partners who perceive this as hindering progress. Additionally, some partner states have not contributed equally to the financial obligations of the regional body. In certain partner states, there is still skepticism towards the projects, or at the very least, a lack of wholehearted support compared to other member states. All these necessitated the call to introduce veto power as an attempt to speed up decision-making on “pertinent” economic decisions.
POLITICAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND VETO POWER WITHIN THE EAC
Some have characterized veto power under international law as the entitlement to refuse a decision or proposal put forth by a legislative body. Essentially, it involves withholding approval for a proposal, potentially leading to its rejection or reconsideration. In certain political and economic unions such as the European Union, this has occurred for certain issues where national interests are high, such as foreign policy, defense, enlargement, finances, or amendments to the treaty. In such instances, member states make decisions based on unanimity. The argument then lies in the rationale behind Kenya’s push for veto within the EAC, when there is a fading allure of veto power across regional organizations that once held on to them, particularly in the European Union, where the African Union and East African Community are modeled after. This is evidenced by the 2009 Lisbon treaty that further solidifies the argument on the impracticality of introducing veto power within the community. The treaty has narrowed down the list of things states can veto. The Council of the EU now makes most decisions by a qualified majority. This means that at least 55% of member states must agree. With the current 27 member states, that’s 15 countries. Together, they must represent at least 65% of the total population of the European Union. This then begs the question, why would the East African community adopt a model that is being modified to represent theirs, while they scramble to wear loose-fitting clothes?
Contrary to the EU, in Africa – upon reflection of their struggles for independence –, they have opted for a consensus-based decision-making model. For instance, according to the East African Community Charter, members have equal voting rights and make most decisions through consensus. However, the effectiveness of this decision-making model on economic projects has been debated over the years, and the introduction of new members has brought challenges in terms of the speed of decision-making coupled with state financial contributions. This has led to calls to ratify the founding treaty of the EAC to introduce veto power, which is argued to be counterproductive and detrimental to the region's autonomy.
The Kenyan delegation proposed a revision of the EAC treaty to adjust partner states' contributions based on their financial capabilities, with those contributing more, gaining veto power. The Kenyan parliamentary Wanjiuku Maina, chair of the Regional Integration, tabled in the Kenyan parliament the need for the committee on regional integration to review, as aforementioned. The proposed amendment to the treaty highlighted that financial constraints resulting from delayed partner state contributions and reduced support from development partners are negatively impacting the performance of EAC institutions, hindering the progress of key projects and programs aimed at improving the lives of East Africans. These challenges, it is argued, underscore the need for a review and amendment of the EAC treaty to include veto power for faster decision-making within the community. Although some might question the extent to which the delegation fully understands the scope of capacity bestowed on veto power and its subsequent functions.
As we look at how the veto is applied in other regional and multinational bodies like the United Nations Security Council, veto power is used to cast a negative vote against any resolution in the UN council by the permanent members or the president of the parliament like that of the European Union. In simpler terms, veto is the right to reject a proposal or decision. From this, we can clearly see that the Kenyan delegation have either misconstrued the capacity of veto power or have refused to overlook its crippling function in these bodies. For the expectation of the delegation that this introduction will increase decisions within the EAC is merely just a mirage. Unless the expectation is to reject various resolutions by other nations that do not have a direct advantage, then this proposal holds no weight.
When looking at veto power, introspection into the political and economic dynamics of states is integral in understanding the effectiveness of this proposal. Going by the proposal, the introduction of veto power fails to consider the intricacies of the member states, particularly the key players such as Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and the ongoing discourse on hegemony in the East African region. These three nations, as the founding members, have essentially established a form of hegemony, positioning themselves as the leaders shaping the politics and vision of the EAC. Kenya, for instance, has played a significant role in peacekeeping efforts, notably in the context of South Sudan and the revitalization of peace agreements. On the other hand, Tanzania has traditionally maintained a more introspective approach, influenced by its socialist history, and has often refrained from commenting on regional or global matters. While collaborating with international and regional partners, Tanzania is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional bloc. Turning to Uganda, the country has played a crucial role in various regional conflicts, such as in Somalia against the al-Shabaab group. Additionally, Uganda has been involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo, partly due to the presence of former rebel groups that originated in Uganda and later moved to the DRC, contributing to instability in the region. Although Kenya remains economically dominant, other countries like Tanzania and Uganda are gradually challenging its economic influence. Therefore, Kenya's push for veto power can be seen as an effort to solidify its leadership position in the region, leveraging its economic strength.
Moreover, the inclusion of veto provisions in the region could potentially lead to the fragmentation of the EAC. Currently, the EAC consists of seven countries, a significant increase from the original three in 1999 or even back in 1967. Approaching a quarter of a century in its second iteration of regional integration and welcoming new members, the EAC has undoubtedly achieved success. Various countries joined the EAC for different reasons – some for historical significance, some to enhance their regional influence, and others to explore new economic and social opportunities. This diversity in motivations highlights the need for consensus among member states to effectively drive the regional integration agenda. Introducing veto powers to select member states based on arbitrary criteria would establish a two-tier membership structure, where certain votes hold more weight than others. This approach would ultimately hinder the progress of EAC initiatives.
The treaty's principles are broad enough to be applied to all members. For example, the treaty emphasizes the importance of being people-centered, market-driven, and led by the private sector. In terms of programs, the focus is on infrastructure and energy development, among other things, with concerns such as membership contributions or official languages being considered basic. Kenya's decision to sign an economic partnership agreement with the European Union undermines the relevance of the EAC, as it disregards the concerns of other EAC members. This suggests that Kenya's push for veto power within the EAC is more self-serving than beneficial for the economic bloc. Members of the EAC are increasingly prioritizing their national interests over the principles of the EAC treaty.
Truthfully, the EAC treaty requires revisions. However, granting veto powers to certain partner states would have a detrimental impact on the future of the regional initiative and is not a top priority within the region. As aforementioned, a hierarchy among partner states would be established, giving some undue authority over others. The current approach of reaching decisions through consensus within the EAC ensures that all voices in the community are acknowledged and respected. The effectiveness of this approach relies on the institutional framework, good governance, and the behavior of member states. To ensure the sustainability of the community, the focus should be on the criteria for admitting new members: ensuring that new members meet set criteria would lessen the burden on financial contribution, which seems to be of concern. Making decisions based solely on financial strength would only lead to further instability in the regional projects. Thus in order to mitigate the latter, a revision of membership criteria is proposed. Kenya's argument that other members are not contributing enough does not justify the introduction of veto powers in an economic integration body that is already struggling. Therefore, one may question the relevance of Kenya's move to introduce veto powers in the EAC, especially within the context of Africa as a whole.
In comparison to the European Union, the EAC does not have the necessary structural, political, social, and actor infrastructure to maintain strong bargaining power during negotiations. The attempt to change the focus of the treaty that established the EAC seems to reflect a neo-colonialist agenda. When regional projects that only benefit certain nations are introduced, it undermines the efforts for economic liberation within the bloc. The issues within the EAC are due to structural and individual challenges within member states. The political will of member states is a key factor in the ongoing challenges facing the EAC. These challenges include political and legal disparities among the governments.
Moreover, the strength of a bloc depends heavily on its leadership. Currently, the EAC is under the leadership of President Salva Kiir from South Sudan, whose leadership is facing challenges due to the fragile state of his country characterized by weak governance, corruption, and insecurity. South Sudan's vulnerability contrasts with the stronger EAC countries it leads, making it difficult for the nation to assert its authority over these more stable states. Therefore, the EAC needs to conduct a thorough self-assessment before considering the introduction of veto power in the decision-making process of the regional organization. The EAC should not only define clear objectives but also take a strong stance in promoting peace and stability among its members and the bloc as a whole, to prevent potential foreign economic influence in the region.
Ultimately, with the continued intervention by the Bretton Woods institutions like the IMF into the economic policies of individual states coupled with influential corporations’ interference in agriculture, the push for veto power will further exacerbate and cement this influence to stretch beyond individual states. The fear that African states do not have the bargaining power and backbone to oppose foreign influence will be actualized at the EAC fronts through veto power privileges.
© 2024, The Nuruba Media & Publishing Company Ltd. & Aberdeen Experience Labs
© 2024, The Nuruba Media & Publishing Company Ltd. & Aberdeen Experience Labs
© 2024, The Nuruba Media & Publishing Company Ltd. & Aberdeen Experience Labs
© 2024, The Nuruba Media & Publishing Company Ltd. & Aberdeen Experience Labs